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Dirty Little Secrets: The Constitutional Feasibility of Implementing Legislation to Compel
Licensing of Trade Secrets to End the COVID-19 Pandemic
Noah Olson
Background
Global COVID-19 Vaccine Administration
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in over 400 million cases resulting in over 5.7
million deaths so far, and those numbers continue to grow, in large part due to unrestricted
spread and the rise of variants, such as Delta and Omicron.1 In the United States alone, there
have been over 77 million cases with over 917,000 deaths, and the milestone of one million
deaths appears inevitable.2 Fortunately for much of the world, the Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna,
and Johnson & Johnson vaccines provide impressive, lifesaving protection against the original
SARS-CoV-2 virus, preventing serious cases of Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19).3
However, not every country has seen the same benefit come from the development of the
vaccines. As of December 23, 2021, 73% of shots have been administered in countries that fall
into the categories of “high-income” or “upper-middle-income.” Meanwhile, countries classified
as “low-income” have seen only 0.9% of total doses administered.4 While the inequality

1

Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 12, 2022),
https://web.archive.org/web/20220213001946/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-cases.html.
2
Coronavirus in the US: Latest Map and Case Count, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 12, 2022),
https://web.archive.org/web/20220213001946/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html.
3
Kathy Katella, Comparing the COVID-19 Vaccines: How Are They Different?, YALE MEDICINE (Mar. 30,
2022)https://web.archive.org/web/20220212230255/https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid-19-vaccinecomparison.
4
Azi Paybarah, Omicron is prompting rich nations to expand booster access. That may prolong the pandemic, the
W.H.O. warns., THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 23, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220114024615/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/23/world/omicron-boosterswho.html.
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reflected in this data is troubling by itself, wealthy countries are also served by ensuring that
vaccine doses are made available to countries with fewer financial resources.
The Effect of Inequitable Vaccine Distribution on the United States
Public health experts have stressed the importance of global inoculation to counter the
spread of the virus. According to experts, the more the virus is allowed to spread, the more
variants will emerge, and each new variant could potentially evade the protection of the vaccine.5
It is, therefore, in the best interest of the United States and other developed countries of the
world to ensure that the vaccine is being shared according to the need of the global population,
rather than according to the ability of low-income countries to pay private corporations for the
vaccine which is the key to ending the global pandemic.
Unfortunately, this has not been the path taken for vaccine distribution. Despite experts’
warnings, significant doses have been distributed to wealthy countries to be used as boosters,
rather than to poorer countries to provide initial inoculation.6 Pleas to increase distribution of
COVID-19 vaccine to low-income countries have been consistent, and a notable instance of such
advocacy was a letter sent to the Biden administration by 175 public health experts on August
10, 2021 requesting measures significantly more rigorous than the current vaccine sharing
programs implemented by the United States.7 Those experts pointed to the likelihood that the

5

Dan Diamond, et Al., ‘Act now’ on global vaccines to stop more-dangerous variants, experts warn Biden, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220113104718/https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/08/10/health-expertsdemand-global-vaccines-pandemic/.
6
Josh Holder, Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 11, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220213031156/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinationstracker.html.
7
Compare Experts Call on Biden to ramp up global vaccine production, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220113105029/https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/experts-call-on-biden-toramp-up-global-vaccine-production/0460154c-ceb5-4799-a502-e6bb9bd35e4a/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4 (experts
request distribution of 10 million doses of vaccine per week and expansion of mRNA vaccine production to capacity
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lack of sufficient vaccine production and distribution would lead to future variants which could
resist the current vaccines and gain other traits that make the virus more dangerous. True to the
predictions of the experts, the Omicron variant arose out of African countries in November, and
was identified in South Africa.8 The first case in the United States was identified on December 1,
2021.9 As the Omicron variant spread through the United States, the high transmissibility of the
variant wreaked havoc on the health care infrastructure.
Despite the assessment that Omicron was less severe than the original mutation or Delta,
the first widespread variant, Omicron retained the life-threatening symptoms of the previous
versions of the virus, especially for unvaccinated individuals who contracted the virus.10 This
combination led to much of the US healthcare system, particularly emergency rooms, being
overwhelmed to the point where patients in need of care are turned away, only to come back
more sick than before.11 While many hope that there will be no further mutations of the virus that
exacerbate the issues that Omicron highlighted, without widespread vaccine distribution and
vaccinations, future variants seem inevitable. What then can be done to work towards vaccine

to 8 billion doses per year) with Monica Alba, et Al., Biden Administration sending 9 million Covid vaccine doses to
Africa, NBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220206202129/https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/white-houseannounce-shipment-9-million-covid-19-vaccines-africa-n1285299 (Biden administration plans to distribute 200
million doses of vaccine in 2021 and 300 million doses in 2022) and Sheryl Stolberg, White House Plans Major
Expansion of Covid Vaccine Production, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 17, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220123044342/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/17/us/politics/biden-covidvaccine-manufacturing.html (Biden administration plans to expand manufacturing capacity to at least one billion
additional doses per year).
8
Tim Lister, et Al., How South African Scientists discovered Omicron and set off a global chain reaction, CNN
(Dec. 2, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220123064148/https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/02/world/south-africa-omicronorigins-covid-cmd-intl/index.html.
9
Rob Picheta, The first cases of Omicron variant identified around the world, CNN (Dec. 2, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220110132850/https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/29/world/covid-omicron-variantcountries-list-cmd-intl/index.html.
10
Will Stone, ERs are overwhelmed as omicron continues to flood them with patients, NPR (Jan. 13, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220211192736/https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2022/01/13/1072902744/ers-are-overwhelmed-as-omicron-continues-to-flood-them-with-patients.
11
Id.
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distribution if the Biden administration’s efforts do not rise to the level required to solve the
problems?
Proposed Legal Solutions to Inequitable Distributions
One such proposed solution is a waiver on international intellectual property rights
guaranteed by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).12 Such a waiver would allow intellectual property
protections for vaccines and other medical products related to COVID-19 to be ignored by other
companies around the world.13 The waiver, proposed by India and South Africa with an aim to
ensure that vaccine production is not bottlenecked by intellectual property ownership, could
mobilize all potential manufacturers to meet global demand for vaccines.14 Despite gaining the
support of nearly all WTO member nations, the waiver is unlikely to pass. All decisions made by
the WTO must be unanimous, so the narrow opposition by Switzerland, Norway, and the United
Kingdom defeats the measure if those nations cannot be persuaded otherwise.15 While there
appears to be some room for negotiating an agreement that excludes India and China from the
waiver but allows African nations, where the vaccines are most needed, to be included, no

12

Subhayan Chakraborty, Despite India push, global IPR waiver proposal for COVID stagnates at WTO, MONEY
CONTROL (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220209044637/https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/trends/current-affairstrends/despite-india-push-global-ipr-waiver-proposal-for-covid-vaccines-stagnates-at-wto-8056421.html.
13
Tom Lee et Al., Intellectual Property, COVID-19 Vaccines, and the Proposed TRIPS Waiver, AMERICAN ACTION
FORUM (May 10, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20211223030432/https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/intellectual-propertycovid-19-vaccines-and-the-proposed-trips-waiver/.
14
Subhayan Chakraborty, Despite India push, global IPR waiver proposal for COVID stagnates at WTO, MONEY
CONTROL (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220209044637/https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/trends/current-affairstrends/despite-india-push-global-ipr-waiver-proposal-for-covid-vaccines-stagnates-at-wto-8056421.html.
15
Id.
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agreement has been reached.16 The delay has been costly. The proposal for a waiver began in
October 2020. According to the NGO Doctors Without Borders (formally known as Médecins
Sans Frontières or MSF), in the one year since the first proposal by South Africa and India was
tabled, more than 3.6 million people died, which MSF says was mostly due to lack of vaccine
availability.17
However, critics of the waiver point to the steps already taken by vaccine producers to
help with global production of vaccines. These critics cite the fact that Moderna has promised
not to enforce its COVID-19 vaccine patents during the pandemic.18 Further, the TRIPS
agreement does not currently apply to countries in the WTO classified as Least-Developed
Countries, or LDCs.19 Those LDCs are therefore able to appropriate the intellectual property of
companies and practice their patents without fear of repercussions from violating the TRIPS
agreement. The evidence of the advantages of companies keeping a loose hold on their
intellectual property during the pandemic is most clear in Cape Town, South Africa, where a
biotechnology company, Afrigen Biologics and Vaccines, has successfully replicated the
Moderna vaccine.20

16

Priti Patnaik, EXCLUSIVE: Efforts to limit the implementation of the TRIPS Waiver, proposals to exclude India &
China, GENEVA HEALTH FILES (Feb. 4, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220204100447/https://genevahealthfiles.substack.com/p/exclusive-efforts-to-limitthe-implementation.
17
Subhayan Chakraborty, Despite India push, global IPR waiver proposal for COVID stagnates at WTO, MONEY
CONTROL (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220209044637/https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/trends/current-affairstrends/despite-india-push-global-ipr-waiver-proposal-for-covid-vaccines-stagnates-at-wto-8056421.html.
18
Tom Lee et Al., Intellectual Property, COVID-19 Vaccines, and the Proposed TRIPS Waiver, AMERICAN ACTION
FORUM (May 10, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20211223030432/https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/intellectual-propertycovid-19-vaccines-and-the-proposed-trips-waiver/.
19
Congressional Research Service. Potential WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 (IF11858), Prepared by Shayerah
Akhtar, et Al. The Hill (Sep. 13, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20211231203354/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11858.
20
Amy Maxmen, South African scientists copy Moderna’s COVID vaccine, NATURE (Feb. 3, 2022)
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Unfortunately, the successful replication of the vaccine using only the information in the
patents has taken a long time. Whereas the first Moderna vaccines were administered in the
United States in the middle of December, 2020.21 The vaccine was not reported to have been
successfully replicated until the beginning of February, 2022.22 In this 14-month period,
Moderna was strongly criticized for failing to reach deals with countries classified as “lowincome” by the world bank, charging more for shots sent to “middle-income” nations than to
countries like the United States and the European Union, and failing to deliver the doses that it
did sell.23 Between December 2020 and February 2022, the world saw the rise of both the Delta
and Omicron variants, which lead to more cases and deaths. Notably, Delta and Omicron were
first identified in India and South Africa, respectively. At the time those variants arose, both
countries’ populations were undervaccinated.24 The lengthy process of replicating the vaccine
took valuable time that could have been spent administering the vaccine to people in countries
outside of the current vaccine producers’ production capacity. However, even with a successful
copycat vaccine, it will take more time to allow manufacturers to develop processes for massproduction of new mimics of the original vaccines.25 In the time it took to develop the mimic,

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00293-2.
21
Madeline Holcombe, et Al., The Moderna vaccine is now in some Americans’ arms as Covid-19 cases in the US
pass 18 million, CNN (Dec. 21, 2020)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220117075848/https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/21/health/us-coronavirusmonday/index.html.
22
Amy Maxmen, South African scientists copy Moderna’s COVID vaccine, NATURE (Feb. 3, 2022)
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00293-2.
23
Rebecca Robbins, Moderna, Racing for Profits, Keeps Covid Vaccine Out of Reach of Poor, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220126192340/http://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/09/business/moderna-covidvaccine.html.
24
COVID-19 Data Explorer, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Last accessed April 14, 2022)
https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/coronavirus-data-explorer?time=2021-1201&facet=none&Metric=People+vaccinated+%28by+dose%29&Interval=7day+rolling+average&Relative+to+Population=true&Color+by+test+positivity=false&country=IND~ZAF.
25
Amy Maxmen, South African scientists copy Moderna’s COVID vaccine, NATURE (Feb. 3, 2022)
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-00293-2.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol6/iss2/5

6

Olson: Dirty Little Secrets: The Constitutional Feasibility of Implement

variants arose, and millions of people died. It seems reasonable to expect the same result with no
change in the global approach.
Therefore, many now point not to relaxation of patent enforcement, but open sharing of
trade secrets that are jealously guarded by the pharmaceutical companies to ensure their future
profits.26 Referred to commonly as “know-how,” trade secrets are a different form of intellectual
property than copyright or patent. Whereas copyright and patent rights are granted to an author
or inventor for a limited term of years in return for publishing the work, trade secrets do not
represent the same transaction between an originator and the public domain. Rather, trade secrets
are kept secret, exactly as the term implies. Much of the information desired by potential vaccine
producers and manufacturers is sequestered in the trade secrets of the pharmaceutical companies,
rather than shared in the patents which are disclosed to the public and, in some cases, are not
being enforced.
Therefore, rather than focusing exclusively on the sharing of patent-protected
information, some organizations are imploring pharmaceutical companies to share this knowhow so that companies mimicking their products can efficiently scale up their productions with
the knowledge that has already been obtained by the major vaccine makers.27 However, these
requests have not been answered, likely in part because the companies who would have to share
their trade secrets see them as potential sources for stunning profits in the future, and would lose
out on those profits if they shared their secrets, because they have no right to prevent others from

26

Mark Schultz, Trade Secrecy and Covid-19, GENEVA NETWORK (Mar. 3, 2022)
https://web.archive.org/web/20211018070838/https://geneva-network.com/research/trade-secrecy-and-covid-19/.
27
One year after first shot, Moderna and Pfizer must urgently share COVID-19 vaccine “recipe” , Doctors Without
Borders (Dec. 8, 2021)
https://web.archive.org/web/20220113140023/https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/newsstories/news/one-year-after-first-shot-moderna-and-pfizer-must-urgently-share-covid.
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using that information once it is disclosed. The pertinent question is therefore not whether lowincome countries and biotechnology companies in those countries can gain access to patented
technology, but how to ensure that the know-how and trade secrets that are being kept by the
companies who are producing insufficient vaccine doses might be shared with the rest of the
world, so that future variants can be prevented, and deaths avoided.
This journal article will consider the legal possibilities available specifically to the United
States federal government to prevent vital intellectual property rights from being used to
exacerbate and propagate a global pandemic. Specifically, this article proposes that Congress has
a responsibility to amend the Defend Trade Secrets Act so that the President has the power to
compel a U.S. citizen or business who operates in interstate commerce to disclose their trade
secrets in a time of crisis that threatens national health or national security.
This proposal of legislation raises questions concerning the constitutional power of the
federal government to take such an action. Specifically, this article addresses the questions (1)
whether the federal government has the ability to take such an action under the current
legislation in place to safeguard national security, (2) under which constitutional powers the
federal government would be capable of effecting such legislation, and (3) how such legislation
might be enacted such that it would avoid infringing on the First Amendment rights of the
private entities holding the rights to the trade secrets.
Because such legislation would be legal under the Constitutional doctrines promulgated
by the Supreme Court, this article concludes by appealing to the fact that failure to take such an
action is costing lives both within the United States and without, and that Congress has a
responsibility to act.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol6/iss2/5
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This possible, and significant, legislation is inspired by two analogous federal statutes in
the United States: 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Defense Production Act (DPA).

DISCUSSION
The Legal Analogues
The first relevant extant federal statutory analogue to the proposed legislation is 28
U.S.C. § 1498. This federal statute effectively allows the federal government to co-opt a patent
registered in the United States. Specifically, the statute allows inventors who own a patent which
the United States practices without license or permission to sue the United States for just
compensation.28 While recent case law disrupts the common description, it is still a useful
analogy to think of the statute as an exercise of eminent domain over intellectual property,
specifically patents.29 The statute allows the United States to exercise a patent, but creates a
cause of action against the United States for the patent owner to recover “reasonable …
compensation.” 30 Such compensation usually falls around ten percent royalty rate to be paid to

28

See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). From the relevant paragraph:
“Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured
by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture. Reasonable and entire
compensation shall include the owner’s reasonable costs, including reasonable fees for expert witnesses and
attorneys, in pursuing the action if the owner is an independent inventor, a nonprofit organization, or an entity that
had no more than 500 employees at any time during the 5-year period preceding the use or manufacture of the
patented invention by or for the United States. Notwithstanding the preceding sentences, unless the action has been
pending for more than 10 years from the time of filing to the time that the owner applies for such costs and fees,
reasonable and entire compensation shall not include such costs and fees if the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
29
See Zoltek Corp. v. U.S. 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
30
28 U.S.C. § 1498.
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the owner of the patent.31 This power has been exercised several times in recent history, both as a
threat and in actual use, from night vision goggle production or anthrax antidote to threaten
“breaking” a patent for a prohibitively-priced drug to treat Hepatitis C.
The proposed statute should follow a similar regime. Trade secrets are currently protected
under federal law by the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). Prior to the enactment of the DTSA
in 2016, trade secret protection was found exclusively at the level of state law. However, with
the federal government’s entry into the arena of protecting trade secrets, it is also appropriate to
allow for a similar “eminent domain” statute to allow the United States to appropriate trade
secrets.
There exist notable differences between the functions of patents and trade secrets that
mean the analogy between the proposed law and 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is not a direct match. Notably,
patent law is derived from the Constitution and is a balance struck between a legal monopoly
granted by the United States in exchange for the information to enter the public domain after
being secured “for limited times.”32 On the contrary, trade secrets are not a kind of intellectual
property enumerated by the Constitution. Instead, trade secrets find federal protection in the
commerce clause of the Constitution.33 The most salient difference is the lack of inevitable entry
into the public domain of a trade secret. As long as a trade secret is kept secret, any
misappropriation of the secret gives rise to a cause of action, although there must be a nexus of
interstate commerce in order for the DTSA to apply, as Congress’s power under the commerce

31

See Deca Ltd. v. U.S. 640 F.2d 1156, 1181 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (finding that a royalty rate of 7.5 percent is
appropriate); and Gargoyles, Inc. v. U.S. 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that a royalty rate of 10
percent determined by the trial court was not clear error).
32
U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
33
Conor Tucker, The DTSA’s Federalism Problem: Federal Court Jurisdiction over Trade Secrets, 28 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1 (2017).
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clause is limited to interstate commerce. Further, unlike a patent, a trade secret need not be
disclosed in order to be protected. In fact, such a disclosure would cause a trade secret owner to
immediately lose their trade secret, as publicly available information cannot be misappropriated.
Therefore, the proposed legislation raises a significant question regarding First Amendment
protections: when can the government compel commercial speech?
The second analogous law is the Defense Production Act of 1950. The legislation was
enacted to grant broad powers to the president to require private citizens and entities to take
actions in the interest of national defense.34 However, in the several dozen times the Act has been
reauthorized, Congress has expanded the purposes for which the president is permitted to utilize
the law. Specifically, while the law still purports to grant authority to take action in the interest
of national defense, “national defense” is defined to mean:
The term "national defense" means programs for military and energy production or
construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, stockpiling, space, and any
directly related activity. Such term includes emergency preparedness activities conducted
pursuant to title VI of The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act [42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq.].35

The referenced Title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
defines emergency preparedness as:
all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to prepare for or minimize the
effects of a hazard upon the civilian population, to deal with the immediate emergency
conditions which would be created by the hazard, and to effectuate emergency repairs to,
or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by the
hazard. 36

34

Jared Brown Et Al., Cong. Research Serv., R43118, Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and
Reauthorization 2 (2013).
35
50 U.S.C. App. § 2152(13)
36
42 U.S.C. §5195(a)(3).
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Thus, despite Congress’s initial purpose that the statute be an avenue by which the President
could better control industry, specifically to wage war, the scope of the act has been significantly
expanded.37 Instead of limiting the President’s grant of power here to issues related to the ability
to defend and wage war, the grant is more expansive, such that the President has the ability to
respond to a wider range of emergencies.
The DPA has become relatively more popular in the 21st Century. President Obama
utilized the Act in 2011 to compel telecommunications companies to reveal confidential
information to help prevent cyber-espionage by China.38 However, with the onset of the
coronavirus pandemic, the Act received much more use and discussion than it had prior. Early in
the pandemic response, President Trump used the Act to classify ventilators and other protective
equipment as “essential to the national defense” such that they would be subject to production
priorities set by his administration.39 Following this initial invocation in response to the
pandemic, the Act was utilized many more times in relation to goods necessary to combat the
pandemic and goods that had faced shortages due to the pandemic.40

37

Jared Brown, Cong. Research Serv., R43118, Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and
Reauthorization 5 (2013).
38
Michael Riley, Obama Invokes Cold-War Security Powers to Unmask Chinese Telecom Spyware, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Nov. 30, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20111202215935/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1130/obama-invokes-cold-war-security-powers-to-unmask-chinese-telecom-spyware.html.
39
David Welna, Trump Invokes a Cold War Relic, The Defense Production Act, for Coronavirus Shortages, NPR
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200319212323/https://www.npr.org/2020/03/18/818069722/trumpinvokes-a-cold-war-relic-the-defense-production-act-for-coronavirus-shorta.
40
See Morgan Chalfant, Trump Signs Executive Order to Prevent Price Gouging, Hoarding of Medical Supplies,
THE HILL (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200325033454/https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/489125-trump-signsexecutive-order-to-prevent-price-gouging-of-medical; Brett Samuels, Trump Uses Defense Production Act to
Require GM to Make Ventilators, THE HILL (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200327203418/https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/489909-trump-usesdefense-production-act-to-require-gm-to-make-ventilators; Jennifer Jacobs, Trump to Order U.S. Meat Plants to
Stay Open Amid Pandemic, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20200428190646/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/trump-sayshe-s-issuing-order-for-tyson-s-unique-liability; Exec. Order No. 14001, 86 F.R. 7219 (Jan. 21, 2021) (Executive
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Both 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the DPA offer important examples of the power available to
the federal government. Both statutes demonstrate the significant ability of the federal
government to mandate compliance from the private sector. However, neither is sufficient to
compel a private individual or entity to disclose its trade secrets to the government. This
conclusion is more readily obvious regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Clearly, a statute allowing the
United States to practice a patent is not applicable to trade secrets. Therefore, it is useful only as
an analogy for the proposed legislation. The conclusion that the DPA does not provide the
requisite authority to compel trade secret licensing is less obvious, but is a result of federal trade
secret law and how the Supreme Court analyzes the powers Congress has granted the president.
Trade Secret Law in the United States
The passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) created a federal cause of
action for an owner of a trade secret to sue for misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to
interstate commerce.41 Prior to the passage of the DTSA, a person or entity whose trade secret
had been misappropriated could sue only under state law, although Congress did criminalize the
theft of trade secrets with the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.42 The DTSA introduced the
powerful mechanism of federal jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation plaintiffs to use.
The DTSA imposes two main requirements for information to be considered a trade
secret: first, the owner of that information must have “taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential,

order from President Biden directing the executive branch to identify shortfalls in the supply of goods needed to
combat COVID-19 and invoking the Defense Production Act to fill those gaps).
41
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).
42
Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade Secrets Act’ is the Biggest IP Development in Years, FORBES (Apr. 26,
2016),
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from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”43
An obvious corollary to this definition is that if the information is made public at any time, it can
no longer be protected as a trade secret. However, that does not mean that any sharing of a trade
secret will cause the information to enter the public domain. Importantly, courts are generally
willing to recognize confidentiality agreements between an owner of a trade secret and other
parties to constitute “reasonable measures” that do not destroy the secrecy of that information.44
The DTSA only protects trade secrets from misappropriation through improper means,
which is also specially defined in the legislation as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means.”45 The statute also provides that it is permissible to discover another’s trade secret
through the processes of “reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means
of acquisition.”46
While intellectual property rights contemplated by the Constitution are limited to a term
of years, the same limitation does not apply to trade secrets.47 Rather, while copyrights and
patents find their origin in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, federal trade
secret protection is regulated by Congress according to its commerce clause power.48 Therefore,
trade secrets provide a distinct advantage over patent law in that information kept as a trade

43

18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
See Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7 th Cir. 1991) (Finding that
contractual precautions the trade secret owner took to retain secrecy, along with physical security precautions, was
sufficient to survive summary judgment.).
45
18 U.S.C. § 1839(6).
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secret can be kept from the public domain forever, as long as the owner of the trade secret takes
reasonable measures to keep the information secret, the information retains its economic value,
and it is not obtained by some lawful means.49
Legislation as it Exists Today does not Suffice
As discussed above, the President has broad authority to compel private entities to
comply with government directives under the DPA, such as requiring companies to manufacture
certain goods or disclose proprietary information relevant to preventing espionage by foreign
powers.50 However, the President’s power to force disclosures of proprietary information has
never been invoked outside of the context of protecting against foreign espionage, and even in
that context, not since the passing of the DTSA in 2016. Despite the unclear legal standard,
advocacy groups such as Doctors Without Borders have asked President Biden to utilize the
DPA to force the companies with vaccine production trade secrets to share those with the
government. 51
Neither Compelled Licensing nor Disclosure is Elaborated in the DPA
The first problem that arises when contemplating the proposed of trade secret licensing or
disclosure under the DPA is a historical one. The DPA has been the topic of conflict between the
Judicial and Executive branches of the federal government before: in the 1952 case Youngstown

49

18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6).
See Brett Samuels, Trump Uses Defense Production Act to Require GM to Make Ventilators, THE HILL (Mar. 27,
2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200327203418/https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/489909-trumpuses-defense-production-act-to-require-gm-to-make-ventilators; Michael Riley, Obama Invokes Cold-War Security
Powers to Unmask Chinese Telecom Spyware, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 30, 2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20111202215935/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-30/obama-invokes-coldwar-security-powers-to-unmask-chinese-telecom-spyware.html.
51
MSF to President Biden: Free the Vaccine for COVID-19, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 10, 2021),
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-president-biden-free-vaccine-covid-19 (last visited 4/10/2022).
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.52 In Youngstown, the Court decided that President Truman’s
executive order allowing the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, to take control of
privately-owned steel mills was unconstitutional because the DPA did not explicitly permit him
to seize property in the way he had ordered his Secretary of Commerce to do.53 Likewise, the
DPA as it exists today does not explicitly permit the President to force a private entity to license
or disclose its trade secrets, unlike how the DPA explicitly allows the President to require
acceptance and performance of a government contract.54 Just as the Court in Youngstown held
that President Truman’s action constituted a conflict between the legislative and executive
branches, it is also likely that a hypothetical executive order under the DPA from President
Biden compelling trade secret licensing or disclosure would be a similar affront to the separation
of powers.
The Youngstown case is also famous for the analyses of the separation of powers
presented by the concurring Justices. Of particular import to a potential trade secret disclosure is
Justice Frankfurter’s description of “gloss” on the words of the Constitution.55 It might be argued
that due to President Obama’s use of the DPA in 2011 to compel telecommunications companies
to disclose some of their proprietary information, there exists an expectation that future
presidents would also be able to compel other private entities to also disclose their trade secrets.
When evaluating the President’s power to take an action not explicitly granted to him by
Congress, as is the case here, it is appropriate to look to historical practice to learn whether the
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executive branch has taken such steps without protest from the legislature. After all, it is efficient
for the branches of government to find standard practices acceptable to both branches and work
within those practices. However, a single instance of trade secret disclosure that was enforced
without objection by the private companies will not qualify as Justice Frankfurter’s “gloss.” In
his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter uses powerful language to describe the type of practices that
might qualify to create a gloss on the executive power of the President: “[A] systemic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government…”56
The Supreme Court has repeatedly been willing to find that the President has the power
to carry out an action despite a lack of textual authority in Article II of the Constitution. This
method of reasoning was used relatively recently when the Court found that there is such
historical gloss on the Article II executive power that the President has executive authority to set
foreign policy, despite that power not being expressly enumerated in the Constitution.57 In
Garamendi, the Court pointed to a history of a recognized authority in the President to make
“executive agreements with other countries” dating back to the beginning of the United States.58
Needless to say, a single act taken by President Obama would not reach the level of systemic
governmental action that would qualify as gloss.
Therefore, it is highly likely that if President Biden took action under the DPA to compel
vaccine-producing companies to license or disclose their trade secrets with the federal

56
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Id. at 610-611.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-414 (2003).
Id. at 415.
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government or manufacturers chosen by the government, the vaccine companies would be
successful in challenging the order in court. Because the DPA does not include an explicit grant
of power for the President to require such licensing or disclosure, the order would be ineffective.
The Effect of the DTSA on a Potential DPA Mandate
Another vital method for analyzing whether the President has authority to take action also
arises out of a concurring opinion from Youngstown. In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson
describes three scenarios in which the President may act with differing levels of endorsement
from Congress.59 The first category of circumstances include actions by the President where he
“acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”60 In this situation, the
President acts with the greatest authority he can wield, as he acts with both his own authority and
all the authority which Congress may grant him.61 Justice Jackson writes that in this situation,
“[the President] may be said to personify the federal sovereignty.”62 That is, the President will
only be found to have acted impermissibly in such an instance if the federal government as a
whole lacks the power to take such an action.63
The second category of presidential action is circumstances in which the President acts,
but Congress has neither granted nor denied the President the authority to take that action.64 In
these circumstances, the President has only his own constitutional powers to justify his actions,
but he is not denied the ability to act where presidential and congressional powers overlap.65
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Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-638.
Id. at 635.
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Id. at 636-637.
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Justice Jackson refers to the powers over which Congress and the President have overlapping
authority as the “zone of twilight,” and that in this zone, when Congress does not take action to
inhibit the President’s power, the legislature “enable[s], if not invite[s]” unilateral presidential
action.66 Justice Jackson goes on to say that when a decision on whether a President has the
power to take an action that falls into this “zone of twilight” must be made, the question is more
focused on whether the surrounding context necessitates the action the President took, rather than
focusing on the pure legal theory.67
The final category that Justice Jackson elaborates are situations where the President acts
in direct opposition to the “express or implied will of Congress.”68 It is in these scenarios in
which the President has the least amount of power. He can rely only on the powers granted to
him, and can make use of none of the powers granted to Congress.69 The President only has the
ability to act in these circumstances if Congress has no authority to take such actions.70
The proper question to ask, then, is if President Biden wishes to compel disclosure of
trade secrets by pharmaceutical companies regarding the manufacturing products of COVID-19
vaccines, into which of these categories of presidential power would that action fall? As has
already been discussed, there is no existing statute passed by Congress that explicitly permits the
President to compel private entities to disclose their trade secrets. There is no explicit ability for
the President to compel trade secret disclosure in the DTSA or the DPA, and while the DPA has
been used as justification to compel disclosures of proprietary information in the past, that use
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was not subjected to judicial scrutiny. Without the explicit endorsement from Congress that the
President has the ability to compel trade secret disclosure, the President’s power to do so falls
into either the second or third category.
However, there is some evidence that Congress has implicitly denied the executive
branch the power to compel trade secret disclosure. The evidence is found in analyzing what
powers Congress has delegated to the President in other areas of law compared to what has been
delegated by the DPA and the DTSA. The first piece of the analysis is to note that Congress has
already passed statutes allowing for the federal government to take control of private citizen’s
intellectual property, namely in 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Because Congress contemplated the need for
the United States to exercise a patent or a copyright in 28 U.S.C. § 1498, it is reasonable to
understand that Congress perceives such a statute to be necessary to enable the President to take
control of a private citizen’s intellectual property. Therefore, because no explicit allowance
exists in the DPA or the DTSA, it is reasonable to believe that by excluding such a provision
from those acts, Congress has implicitly denied the President the right to compel private citizens
to disclose or license their trade secrets to the federal government. Because an implicit denial of
right can be found by analyzing the context of the DTSA and the analogous legislation, a court
would find that the President’s power to compel disclosure or licensing of trade secrets lies in the
third category Justice Jackson described in Youngstown. As a result, the only way the President
could legally effectuate such an action would be if he had the power to do so under his Article II
powers and Congress did not have any powers of its own to allow such actions. Because trade
secrets are protected at the federal level under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce,
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this is not the type of act delegated to the President independent of Congress, and therefore he
would be unable to effectuate such an order.71
Based on what can be deduced on Congressional intent from the DPA, DTSA, and 28
U.S.C. § 1498, an action taken to compel disclosure or licensing of trade secrets from
pharmaceutical companies regarding vaccine manufacturing would fall into Justice Jackson’s
final category. Therefore, the President would not have the power to effectuate such an order
under the current statutory landscape. In order for necessary, pandemic-ending, lifesaving
measures to be taken, Congress would have to pass legislation granting the President the power
to compel trade secret disclosure or licensing. This legislation would fit well into either the DPA
or the DTSA, and would be predicated on Congress’s power to provide for national defense,
defined as it is in the DPA.72 With such legislation in place, the power of the President to compel
trade secret disclosure or licensing would move into the first category Justice Frankfurter
elaborated in his concurrence in Youngstown. Instead of his powers being restricted only to what
is granted exclusively to the executive branch, as is currently the case, the President would be
able to act with the full power possessed by the federal government.73 With the full force of the
federal government, the President would have the requisite power to effect such an order.
The Proposed Legislation would not Violate the 1st Amendment
Even when the federal government as a whole has the power to act, that action may still
infringe on a constitutional right, and therefore be constitutionally invalid. Such an issue arises
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here, as compelled disclosure or licensing of a trade secret constitutes compelled speech, which
is generally impermissible under the free speech protections of the First Amendment.74
Generally, courts are loath to compel speech from individuals.75 In one of the most
famous Supreme Court cases on the topic of free speech, the Court held that a state cannot
compel schoolchildren to recite the pledge of allegiance in public school.76 While much First
Amendment litigation arises out of restrictions on speech, it is clear from the Court’s
jurisprudence that regulation is not the only form of speech control that is impermissible.
Specifically, the Court has elaborated:
There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but
in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance,
for the First Amendment guarantees “freedom of speech,” a term necessarily comprising
the decision of both what to say and what not to say.77
In these decisions, the Court has recognized an individual’s right to preserve their own “freedom
of mind.”78 Important in the analysis the courts employ in cases where they find a freedom from
governmentally-compelled speech is that the speaker would be compelled to state some belief.79
This reasoning maps strongly to the general policy of the Court that speech will be protected
when it is “in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.”80 Importantly, the Court does not include fact-based speech in the lists of speech
that are highly protected by the First Amendment.
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Rather, courts have recognized that compelled speech that does not offend the protections
of the First Amendment when the state is not compelling an affirmation of a belief.81 Notably, in
State v. Grover, the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that a statute mandating that school
professionals report child abuse or face criminal prosecution (known as mandatory reporting
requirements) did not violate a principal’s First Amendment right to free speech.82 Therefore,
because the act of reporting facts does not constitute expressive conduct, the First Amendment is
not implicated.83
The question for the proposed statute is then whether a court would consider a compelled
disclosure or licensing of trade secrets to be expressive conduct or simple reporting of facts.
Because the trade secrets in question are facts about how the companies in question manufacture
the COVID-19 vaccines, it is clear that the speech that would be compelled by the government
would be factual, rather than expressive. As a result, if the companies challenged the proposed
statute, courts would follow the lead of the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Grover and find
that without a determination that the compelled speech is expressive, the First Amendment is not
violated.
While it would be appropriate for a court to find that the First Amendment is not
implicated at all in such a case, it remains a possibility that some courts would not dismiss claims
of unconstitutionality out of hand, and may apply a standard as strict as intermediate scrutiny to
the First Amendment analysis of the statute. Intermediate scrutiny is likely to be the highest
scrutiny a court will apply to the proposed legislation, as the interests at play resemble those
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subject to the commercial speech test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. While the speech in question does
not fit into the commercial speech doctrine, as compelled speech is clearly not “speech proposing
a commercial transaction,” it is nevertheless a useful approximation of what might be expected
in a court’s analysis.84 In fact, courts may apply a less strict standard of review than intermediate
scrutiny, as the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to rely on rational basis review when a
state compels speech in conjunction with commercial speech which is “purely factual and
uncontroversial information.”85 The Court in Zauderer held that in the context of commercial
speech, compelled speech in conjunction with advertisements does not violate the advertiser’s
First Amendment rights as long as the disclosure required by the state is “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”86 However, because the speech in
Zauderer originated with the advertising party reaching out to the public, the facts are still
slightly removed from potential claims of unconstitutionality against the proposed act, so
intermediate scrutiny will be assumed.
As defined in Craig v. Bolren, intermediate scrutiny requires that a government action
must serve important governmental objectives, and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.87 Additionally, if the Central Hudson test is applied in full, the
statute must also be narrowly tailored to serve that governmental interest.88 Therefore, the
specific wording and application of the proposed statute are vital to ensure that it survives the
test of intermediate scrutiny. The first two prongs at issue are met with relative ease, if the statute
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is worded properly to indicate that the purpose the statute serves is to ensure national security
and the trade secrets whose disclosure or licensing are compelled are the kind of trade secrets
that would directly aid in the safeguarding of national security.
However, the issue of ensuring that the statute is narrowly tailored is especially important
for a statute that requires private entities to share trade secrets. As discussed above, if a trade
secret is disclosed to the public, then the information loses its status as a trade secret, for at that
point the information would be able to be attained by anyone in the public via lawful means.89
Therefore, the statute should proscribe how the information should be dealt with to ensure that it
does not enter the public domain, for if the private entity absolutely loses its intellectual property
to the public domain, rather than only temporarily to respond to national crises, the law would no
longer be considered to be narrowly tailored. An appropriate way to ensure that the trade secrets
do not enter the public domain is to implement an extensive licensing program with strong
confidentiality agreements in place, as courts have been willing to accept confidentiality
agreements as sufficient measures for an owner of a trade secret to retain their rights.90
Therefore, with national security purposes indicated and the rights of the private entities
protected, the law would be capable of passing intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic where global need for vaccine doses is not being
met, the trade secrets of the pharmaceutical companies who produce the vaccines constitute vital
knowledge that, if shared with the rest of the world, would save countless lives. Despite appeals
to global leaders from the scientific community, the inoculation needs of low-income countries
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have consistently not been met. The result of this failure to equitably distribute doses of vaccine
has been significant, preventable loss of life in wealthy and impoverished countries alike.
Greater vaccine distribution would have the dual effect of saving the lives of the people who
receive the vaccines in lower-income countries and preventing further mutations of the virus
from causing more waves of death in the United States.
Because the companies who produce these vaccines have shown an unwillingness to
adequately share their trade secrets with manufacturers capable of expanding vaccine production,
it has become imperative that international agreements be made to relax intellectual property
rights to help save the lives of millions around the world. However, as demonstrated by the
inability of countries to agree on a TRIPS waiver, it has become incumbent upon the federal
government of the United States to take the actions it can to help disseminate the information
under its purview to right this wrong.91
However, under the current legislation in place in the United States, the executive branch
is not authorized to take the vital steps to compel the pharmaceutical companies to disclose or
license their trade secrets. Therefore, it is imperative that Congress pass new legislation which
empowers the President to take those actions. The proposed legislation is necessary to ensure the
safety and national security of the United States through preventing spread of disease at home, as
well as ensuring stabilization abroad.
However, regardless of the perceived necessity of a governmental action, the federal
government is permitted to take only actions that can be justified by a power dedicated to it in
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the Constitution.92 Even when the federal government is given a power to take an action by the
powers granted to it by the Constitution, that action may also infringe on rights protected by that
same Constitution. Therefore, it is imperative to craft legislation that stays within the bounds of
the powers of Congress and the President delineated in the Constitution, and to avoid
impermissibly infringing on the rights of the affected private citizens or entities. These
requirements can be crafted by careful wording of the legislation to stay within the bounds set by
the Supreme Court in previous cases.
In order to properly fall within the bounds of power of Congress and the President, such
legislation could be enacted under Congress’s authority to provide for national defense of the
country. As demonstrated by the Defense Production Act of 1950, Congress’s power to provide
for the national defense may be construed very broadly to include “emergency preparedness”
such as minimizing the effects of a hazard upon the civilian population. 93 When Congress
delegates these powers to the President, he would be able to act with the full authority of the
federal government, ensuring that the President’s actions will not be declared void for want of
authority.
Due to the nature of how the trade secrets would be compelled from the private entities,
the First Amendment rights of those entities would be implicated. Therefore, to ensure that the
statute would survive intermediate scrutiny with the added prong for commercial speech in
Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission of New York, it is of utmost importance to specify
that the only trade secrets that will be subject to mandatory disclosures or licensing would be
those trade secrets which would directly benefit the national security of the country. Further, it is
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important to also ensure that the trade secrets of the companies will be kept confidential so that
the companies can continue to enjoy their trade secrets once the pandemic crisis has subsided.
Otherwise, should the private entities lose their trade secret protection, a court could easily find
that the statute is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, and is therefore invalid.
Therefore, if the legislation is properly crafted, it would properly enable the President to
act to compel pharmaceutical companies who manufacture COVID-19 vaccines to license their
trade secrets to other manufacturers. This licensing would ease the manufacturing bottleneck of
vaccine distribution, and help doses of COVID-19 vaccine be distributed to low-income
countries, thereby preventing death in those countries and future mutations of the virus. The
result of preventing future mutations by denying the virus a population of unvaccinated humans
within which it could mutate would indirectly benefit the United States by preventing future
waves of COVID-19 variants. As demonstrated by the waves of disease caused by the Delta and
Omicron mutations, the mutations cause severe hazards to civilians, overflowing hospitals,
choking supply lines, and killing Americans on a massive scale. Therefore, it is vital for
Congress to introduce such legislation to help curb the COVID-19 pandemic and ensure that the
United States is better prepared for a global pandemic in the future. While solutions such as the
proposed legislation remain, Congress is shirking its duty to provide for the defense and welfare
of Americans by failing to take action that could save countless lives, both at home and around
the world.
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